Travis’ research interests are primarily in American campaigns and elections, especially non-federal campaigns. Within that family of research, he is specifically interested in voter behavior, political communication, the political consultancy, elite (candidate) behavior, elections policy and administration, the effects of campaigns, and campaign strategy.
Current Working Papers
If you are interested in reading any of the following papers and providing feedback on them, please feel free to contact Travis to request a current draft.
“Elected (In)Justice? The Effect of Judicial Elections on Racial Disparity in State Incarceration Rates“
ABSTRACT: Racial minorities in the United States, undeniably, experience the criminal justice system very differently than Whites. Blacks, in particular, receive longer sentences for committing the same crime as Whites. The long-term effect of sentencing disparity is that racial minorities make up a disproportionate share of the prison population, compared to their share of the general population. What role, if any, does the mechanism by which trial court judges are selected in the states play in creating these inequities? If judges must stand for election, I predict that they will behave in a way that will win them favor with more punitive and racially biased state electorates, leading to greater racial disparities in states with elected trial court judges. Using a dataset previously unused in the political science literature and a time-series linear regression analysis, this paper explores the relationship between judicial retention institutions and racial disparity in rates of incarceration in the American states and finds that states with trial court judges retained via partisan elections have lower racial disparities than states with appointed trial court judges, while states with uncontested retention elections or non-partisan elections have no discernable effects on the racial disparities observed. In short, the mechanism by which trial court judges are retained has an important and influential impact on criminal justice outcomes.
“Judicial Selection and Criminal Punishment: Trial Court Elections, Sentencing, and Incarceration in the States”
ABSTRACT: Building on extant research in political science and related disciplines, this paper develops and tests a theory positing that states with elections for judicial retention, whereby citizens have direct input on whether a trial court judge retains his or her seat on the bench, will be more punitive than states where voters do not have such a direct mechanism for judicial accountability. Leveraging a dataset previously unused in political science, I estimate time-series regressions of state sentencing and incarceration rates over a 38-year period while distinguishing between types of elections to establish support for the theory. Results suggest that states where judges are re-elected are more punitive than states without such electoral institutions, indicating that elections serve as an important judicial accountability mechanism for citizens. Moreover, states with non-partisan judicial elections are the most punitive, indicating that judges likely behave on the bench in a way that gives them a ready-to-run campaign message that can replace for the voters the forbidden heuristic of party affiliation.
“The Effect of Campaign Expenditures on Trial Court Election Competition: Evidence from Louisiana”
ABSTRACT: Money drives American politics. Campaigns spend an increasing amount of money every year conveying their messages to voters in an effort to push the candidate past the finish line on Election Day. Previous research shows that campaign spending is positively related to electoral competition, i.e., how close of an outcome is produced on Election Day, and the evidence is conclusive: increased spending translates to increased competition. This relationship exists also in campaigns for state supreme courts, but research has not extended the investigation to the trial court level. This paper investigates the relationship between campaign expenditures and vote share in trial court elections. Using an original dataset of trial court elections in Louisiana for the years 2010-2018, linear regression analyses, and an instrumental variable approach, I find that increased spending also increases competition, but its effects on competition are limited. These findings suggest that previous reports of the positive relationship apply to trial court elections and provide further evidence that voters use judicial elections as an accountability mechanism.
“How State Legislative Candidates Choose Their Political Consultants and Why It Matters”
ABSTRACT: The political consulting industry has transformed American democracy and redefined electioneering for the foreseeable future. More campaigns than ever before are using consultants, and more money is spent to pay retainers, commissions, and win bonuses than at any time in our history. Political consultants enjoy unfettered access to their clients, and because consultants enjoy such an intimate relationship with their clients, it is conceivable that political consultants can influence their clients-turned-elected-officials on matters of public policy. Thus, the consultancy and the process by which consultants are chosen by candidates should be subjected to close academic scrutiny. Through the use of qualitative and inductive research, this paper begins to provide that scrutiny. Semi-structured elite interviews begin to reveal themes that will help scholars understand the decision-making processes of candidates when hiring political consultants.
“Self-Deception and Voter Behavior in the 2015 Louisiana Gubernatorial Primary Election”
ABSTRACT: This article introduces the psychological concept of self-deception—i.e., simultaneously holding two contradictory beliefs, being unaware of holding one of those beliefs, and suppressing the belief through a motivated act—to explain electoral behavior using a survey of Louisiana voters during the 2015 gubernatorial primary. I begin by examining the individual-level characteristics that predict self-deception among citizens. I then examine how self-deception influences likely voter turnout at the individual level. Finally, I evaluate how self-deception shapes individuals’ beliefs about the election. Although I find no significant relationship between self-deception and turnout, results indicate that individuals’ self-deception shapes their beliefs about the election. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of my research.